Abstract-In this paper, we investigate a two-stage Stackelberg game for dynamic spectrum access (DSA) in cognitive radio networks using a leader [spectrum provider (SP)] subgame and a follower [secondary user (SU)] subgame. Our research distinguishes itself in a number of ways. First, a two-stage Stackelberg game has been proposed to provide a unique optimal solution that facilitates a tradeoff between quality of service (QoS) of unlicensed SUs and revenue of SPs. Second, comprehensive budget and QoS constraints imposed by the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio are defined to fully take into account QoS requirements. Third, a necessary condition and closed form for the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium are presented for multiradio multichannel DSA. Analytical and simulation studies are carried out to assess the performance of the proposed game, and the numerical results verify that the proposed approach reaches the unique Stackelberg equilibrium.
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I. INTRODUCTION

W
IRELESS service providers are experiencing exponential growth in wireless traffic [1] because of widespread use of lightweight hand-held devices to access wireless networks. Moreover, recent studies [2] - [4] have shown that the static radio frequency (RF) spectrum allocation policy has resulted in "artificial spectrum scarcity" since the allocated RF bands are either idle or underutilized most of the time, and the unlicensed secondary users (SUs) are not allowed to access the idle/underutilized bands. As a consequence, if these problems are left unaddressed, many wireless service providers will be facing severe spectrum shortage [2] , [5] .
Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) is an emerging concept for an efficient utilization of RF spectrum by allowing SUs to access the licensed spectrum opportunistically without causing harmful interference to the licensed primary users (PUs) [6] , [7] . For opportunistic spectrum access, SUs are required to either sense the channels to identify idle bands or search them on the geolocation database according to the Federal Communications Commission policy in the United States [8] - [10] . When SUs search for spectrum opportunities, the geolocation database of spectrum opportunities provides a global view on the entire frequencies, thus providing the best channel(s) to the SUs. For example, an SU looking for high bandwidth could request/select a channel that has more adjacent idle channels for channel bonding [11] . Another SU looking for a reliable link could request the least interfered channel in the past. We consider that the spectrum providers (SPs) or brokers receive spectrum occupancy information either from spectrum sensors or from the infrastructures (e.g., base stations or access points) of licensed/primary systems. Based on the received spectrum occupancy information, SPs create geolocation maps of spectrum opportunities for different wireless networks (e.g., WiMAX, cellular, and satellite), and SUs with multiple radios search the spectrum opportunities in these geolocation maps.
In this paper, we investigate a two-stage Stackelberg game for DSA, where SUs equipped with multiple radios compete for a high achievable data rate subject to budget and quality of service (QoS) constraints imposed by their minimum required signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios (SINRs), and the SPs compete to provide competitive price of RF spectrum use subject to their spectral capacities. When SUs access multiple channels of different networks such as cellular, satellite, TV, and Wi-Fi networks, it can be interpreted as network diversity. Each device is equipped with multiple radios to provide fullduplex communications when transmitting and receiving radios are tuned in different nonoverlapping channels in a multiradio multichannel (MRMC) wireless network [12] . The MRMC wireless communication is popular in the context of wireless mesh networks, emerging cellular networks, and broadcasting in wireless networks [13] - [15] to increase data rates and to avoid mutual interference. Moreover, using MRMC wireless systems, one radio can be used for voice and another for data communication simultaneously to provide Talk-and-Surf-like features [16] .
A. Related Work
DSA has been extensively studied for cognitive radio networks (CRNs). Price-based resource allocation in two-tier femtocell networks using a price bargaining algorithm has been presented in [17] where interference from SUs (femtocell users) is considered as a price to reduce the SUs' payoffs. Optimal bandwidth allocation using channel reconfiguration for SUs to maximize the per-SU throughput has been studied in [18] .
Utility maximization for both PUs and SUs is investigated in [19] . Cooperative spectrum sharing is investigated in [20] to provide incentives using a contract-based approach where SUs have incomplete information about the PUs. Similarly, bargaining for relay-based cooperative spectrum sharing is presented in [21] where SUs relay the PU traffic to help improve the PU's effective data rate as a payoff for the use of the idle licensed spectrum of the PUs. To maximize system throughput, band selection and power control were studied in [22] . Senthuran et al. [23] have proposed a Markov process for the selection of transmission modes (spectrum underlay and overlay) to maximize throughput for SUs. An auction-based channel allocation mechanism is proposed in [24] to maximize both total and PU throughput under interference constraints on primary receivers. Furthermore, an auction-theory-based algorithm for centralized assignments of frequencies and time slots to maximize throughput using DSA with a multiple-antenna system is presented in [25] , where the algorithm uses a first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism in which frequency and time-slot pairs are considered as the auctioned resources, and the SUs are the bidders. For a spectrum underlay CRN, a particular set of SUs attains certain target SINRs while satisfying the target SINRs of the remaining users subject to the total transmission power and the interference leakage constraints in [26] . The QoS requirements in terms of target SINRs are investigated for DSA in [27] and [28] , where SUs transmit their information without causing harmful interference to PUs without considering the budget constraints and any incentive to PUs.
We note that none of these existing techniques take into account the impact of QoS and budget constraints of the multiradio SUs in multichannel heterogeneous wireless systems while maximizing their achievable data rates. Meanwhile, existing methods do not consider maximizing revenues of primary systems, which is received from SUs for opportunistic spectrum access of licensed bands. 1 
B. Main Contributions
Admissibility of an SU (who is seeking for spectrum access) is checked by a cosine similarity matching process by using geolocations of idle bands and the SU. We investigate a novel approach for DSA using a two-stage Stackelberg game to provide a unique optimal solution that facilitates a tradeoff between QoS of SUs and revenues of SPs. In the first stage, multiradio SUs (the followers in the game) maximize their payoffs (i.e., achievable rates) while satisfying their power, budget, and QoS constraints. In the second stage, the SPs (the leaders of the game) offer competitive prices for spectrum usage to maximize their revenues subject to their system capacities. We present a necessary condition and closed form for the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium for the two-stage Stackelberg game. We also investigate the existence of a unique optimal solution for the proposed game. Analytical and simulation studies are presented to evaluate the performance of the proposed game 1 Since primary/licensed operators pay licensing fees to the government bodies, it is thus reasonable to consider revenue collection from SUs while they access the licensed RF spectrum. and to verify that the proposed approach reaches Stackelberg equilibrium.
C. Paper Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the system model and formally states the problem studied in this paper. In Section III, we formulate a two-stage Stackelberg game with two (the SU and the SP) subgames for DSA and investigate the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium and a condition for the optimality. In Section IV, we present a formal algorithm followed by simulation results in Section V. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The system model considered in this paper is given in Fig. 1 . We assume that SPs have spectrum maps consisting of geolocations of idle spectrum bands of different wireless networks such as cellular, satellite, and WiMAX. The spectrum map consists of geolocations in the form of (x b , y b , z b ) and the radius R of idle contours where SUs can communicate [9] , [10] , [29] . Maps are assumed to be updated in real time with the help of distributed cloud computing [8] , [29] . Note that the SPs create maps of idle bands for each network based on the received channel occupancy information using distributed cloud computing. The spectrum occupancy information could be received either from the base station of wireless networks or spectrum sensors, which is out of the scope of this paper (for spectrum sensing algorithms, readers are referred to [30] and references therein). Note that the real-time status reports of spectrum opportunities will necessitate the availability of stream processing and continuous computation. The processing and computation cannot be conducted by SUs as their performance is considerably constrained by their limited power, memory, and computational capacity. Distributed cloud computing is a potential solution to mitigate these constraints due to its vast storage and computational capacity [9] , [29] .
We assume that when an SU wants to use spectrum opportunities, it searches the geolocation database by sending its own geolocation (x s , y s , z s ) to the SPs. The SPs, on behalf of SUs, run the Storm model [9] , [29] , [31] with the help of distributed cloud computing to find whether or not the spectrum band for the requested geolocation is available using cosine similarity criteria between geolocation of idle bands
Note that when a b and r s exactly match, the value of M b,s is equal to one which is the ideal case for opportunistic spectrum access. However, without loss of generality, SUs are admitted to access spectrum bands that satisfy M b,s > M th b,s criteria. Otherwise, the SUs do not get admission/permission to access the spectrum. The threshold M th b,s can be adapted based on the received spectrum occupancy information and radius of the spectrum contour. It is assumed that SUs operating in a same channel use code-division multiple access technology with suitable transmit waveforms to avoid interference from others (e.g., [33] and [34] ).
Our goal in this paper is to cast a problem of maximizing the achievable rates of active SUs and the revenue of SPs as a two-stage Stackelberg game where the imposed constraints are satisfied and to investigate the closed form and existence of a unique optimal Stackelberg equilibrium of the game.
III. STACKELBERG GAME FORMULATION
Here, we propose a Stackelberg game to maximize payoffs of SUs and revenues of SPs with proper pricing schemes. In the game, SPs are the Stackelberg leaders who set the pricing parameters for spectrum usage using noncooperative game and subsequently announce that information to SUs who are the Stackelberg followers. SUs choose their respective strategies to maximize their payoffs. Note that the Stackelberg game falls under the category of a dynamic game, and a common solution concept in the Stackelberg game is the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). A powerful technique to get SPE is backward induction [35] . To derive the SPE, our analysis starts with Stackelberg followers based on the knowledge of price set by the leaders. Then, analysis moves backward to Stackelberg leaders to analyze how a leader can choose optimal pricing parameters rationally.
A. SU Rate Maximization Subgame (SURMG)
We assume that there are N number of SUs and K = {1, 2, . . . , K} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , K c }Considering the received signal to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with zero mean and σ 2 s variance and noise that corrupts the received signal assumed to be the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) and i.i.d. with variance of σ 2 n , the SINR γ n,k of an SU n ∈ N in a band k ∈ K can be defined as γ n,k = σ 2 s /σ 2 n . Note that when instantaneous SINR γ n,k falls below a desired minimum SINR γ n,k 3 (i.e., γ n,k < γ n,k ) outage occurs. To measure the performance, considering the probability density function of the instantaneous SINR f γ n,k (γ n,k ) as exponential for considered i.i.d. Raleigh fading channels, the probability of an outage event occurring can be calculated as [36] 
whereγ n,k is the time average of SINR values, and R n,k is the data rate for the nth user in band k. For the maximum allowed outage probability, i.e.,P ,γ n,k can be calculated using (2) when
Note that the transmissions with low SINR will waste battery life of a mobile device and create unnecessary interference to other active SUs. Thus, if a required SINR threshold of an SU is not satisfied, the SU should be dropped from the system. The achievable data rate for an SU n in a channel k with an arbitrarily small error probability is given by [37] 
where w n,k is the bandwidth allocated to SU n in channel k. We define the sum rate (or payoff) of SU n as
We define the SURMG for payoff/rate maximization with the following components: 1) Players: N = {1, 2, . . . , N} is the set of players that are the active SUs; 2) Strategies: Actions taken by the players to maximize their payoffs; 3) Payoff: Outcome in (4) of a player based on chosen strategies. We assume that c k is the unit price 4 set by the service provider k, and B n denotes the budget of SU n (which is similar to the payment/budget for a data/voice plan that wireless users pay to their cellular service providers), and mathematically,
n , P ay) that depends on transmit power of SU n and its payment P ay for the wireless service (e.g., [38] and [39] ). Based on a given set of prices {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c K }, SU n ∈ N calculates its optimal payoff by solving the following optimization problem:
where p n,k is the maximum power allowed for SU transmission. When a given user is set to transmit its information with its power p n,k = min{p n,k , γ n,k σ 2 n }, we can relax the power constraint p n,k ≤ p n,k in (5). Then, we can write (5) as
The optimization problem (6) is convex in γ n,k , and thus, the problem has a unique and optimal solution. Theorem 1: The optimal SINR that maximizes the payoff in (6) for SU n in a given band k is
Proof: Refer to the Appendix. Corollary 1: A necessary condition to satisfy QoS imposed
Proof: Note that to avoid outage, each radio should satisfy its minimum SINR requirement. Thus, when we use γ n,k ≥ γ n,k in (7), we can easily get (8) .
Conversely, user n needs γ n,k ≥ γ n,k in channel k if
A closed form for a necessary condition for γ n,k ≥ γ n,k , ∀ n, ∀ k will be derived in the following section. Based on the SU's response in (7), we can next move to leaders' subgame in the Stackelberg game, where we investigate how to design the optimal pricing parameters for SPs.
B. SPPSG
The SP price selection subgame (SPPSG) is a noncooperative game in the sense that a given player is interested only in maximizing its outcome without paying attention to how its actions affect the other players. A noncooperative game consists of a set of players, a set of strategies/actions associated with each player, and an outcome associated with each player [40] .
where β k 1 is the price adjustment parameter for channel k of a given SP, and
is the spectral capacity in terms of SINR that could be supported by the given channel k without degradation of the network performance in which N k is the total number of users that could be supported by a given network in an ideal scenario. For instance, an AP in a Wi-Fi network could support about N k = 30 users without degrading the network performance significantly. The SPs choose their optimal pricing parameters to maximize their own revenues. Note that each SP updates the price for each channel and makes it available to users. The update process continues in the game until the price values c k , ∀ k for each SP converge. Now, we define a revenue (payoff) function of a given SP as
where a revenue function of an SP, i.e., u sp,k (c k , c −k ), for a given channel k and spectral capacity S k is
The SPPSG is formally defined as
where the three components of the game are as follows.
. . , K} is the set of active players that are the active SPs with K ≤ K channels in the system where each SP could hold a single or multiple channels/bands. 2) S k is the set of pricing strategy of an SP in channel k given by (10). 3) U sp (.) : {S 1 × · · · × S K } is the payoff given in (11) that maps strategy spaces to positive real numbers. To investigate the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium for the game and to identify the best response strategies of players, we state the following formal definitions from game theory in the context of our problem.
Definition 1 (Stackelberg Equilibrium for the SPPSG):
The price set {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c K } is a Stackelberg equilibrium for the SPPSG for every SP in k ∈ K, if we have that
where c −k = {c 1 , . . . , c k−1 , c k+1 , . . . , c K } is the price set by SPs for channels other than k. Note that Stackelberg equilibrium is a strategy profile that neither the SPs nor the SUs have the incentive to deviate from the equilibrium.
Definition 2 (Best Response for the SPPSG):
The best response of an SP in k to other players' strategies is the set
Now, we express the revenue optimization problem for an SP as
subject to
We note that the sum of maximum values of 
Revenue is an increasing function in c k , and thus, there exists a unique optimal solution. Theorem 2: Optimal price c k that maximizes the revenue of an SP in k in (18) is given by
Proof: Revenue optimization can be solved by Lagrangian operation by expressing (18) with (19) and (20) as
Substituting (7) into (22) and computing ∂L sp,k /∂c k = 0, ∀ k, for the first-order optimality, we get
We can rearrange the terms in (23) as
For each k ∈ K using (24), solving for ν k , we get
From (7) and using the equality in (19) , after some algebraic steps, we get
which proves Theorem 2. By substituting c k in (25) by (26), we can calculate ν k . Note that for B n > 0, ∀ n ∈ N and unit price c k > 0, ∀ k ∈ K, when K = 1, ν k = 0 and (26) gives c k = ( ∀n B n /S k ). Thus, referring to (25) , there is no game (i.e., no competition) when there is only one SP with a single channel.
C. Best Response for the Stackelberg Game
Theorem 3: The value of price obtained from (26) maximizes the payoffs of SUs in the game SURMG and the revenues of SPs in the game SPPSG and is the best responses of the given SP in k ∈ K.
Proof: Consider that c k is the solution obtained from (26) , and the price increases from c k to c k = c k + δ k for δ k > 0 and given c −k of the other providers rationally using noncooperative game. Let us assume that (9) is satisfied by c k and c k . First, we consider the SUs' SU RM G game and compute new γ n,k from (7) by replacing c k with c k as
Then, we can compute the difference of γ n,k and γ n,k as
Since c k > c k for δ k > 0, from (28), it is clear that γ n,k − γ n,k > 0, which implies that u su,n (γ n,k ) < u su,n (γ n,k ). That is, there will be no increase in SU's payoff because of change in c k . Then, we consider SPs' SP P SG game and compute the difference in the revenues of the SPs because of increase in price from c k to c k as
Substituting (7), (26) , and (27) into (29), we get
From (30), for which contradicts (14) . Furthermore, when δ k < 0 for a given k, we will have c k < c k for a given system, and there will be decrease in revenue.
Therefore, the price value calculated in (26) is the best response of the Stackelberg game (i.e., for both subgames SURMG and SPPSG), which proves Theorem 3.
D. Existence and Uniqueness of the Stackelberg Game
A Nash equilibrium exists for the SPs in the price selection game if 1) {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c k , . . . , c K } is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset of some Euclidean space R K , and 2) u sp,k (c k ,
Since c k is a finite value, the strategy set is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset of the Euclidean space
Thus, there exists a Nash equilibrium for this game. Furthermore, as proven in the previous section (see Section III-C, Theorem 3), there exists only one positive solution for the price selection SPPSG game.
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of the SPPSG game and, thus, the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game, is unique and optimal.
IV. ALGORITHM
Based on the analysis in Section III, we present a formal iterative algorithm as Algorithm 1. Solve (5) for given c k (t), ∀ k using (7). 6:
Send the demanded γ n,k in (7) to SPs.
7:
Calculate the user payoff u su,n . 8: end for 9: For each k, update the price c k (t + 1) using (10 
Send a no change in price message to the users. 13: else 14:
Announce c k (t + 1) to users and go to Step 3. 15: end if 16: end for only if there is c k (t + 1) − c k (t) ≤ , ∀ k and change in instantaneous SINRs are within the limit ∀ n ∈ N . //An optimal Stakelberg equilibrium has been reached.
STOP. 17: OTHERWISE, GO TO Step 3
The check of the optimality condition in Step 16 in Algorithm 1 ensures that the Stackelberg game reaches at optimal Nash equilibrium and that the algorithm does not stop in a suboptimal fixed point. The complexity of Algorithm 1 is O (N + K) or O(max(N, K) ). 
V. SIMULATION AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
In order to illustrate the performance of the proposed algorithm, we have performed extensive simulations and evaluated the convergence of the proposed iterative algorithm.
In the first experiment, we considered different values of N and K = K with w n,k = 1, ∀ n, ∀ k, that is, the ratio N/K = {1, 2, 4, 6} (which represents equally loaded when N/K = 1 to heavily overloaded when N/K = 6) using randomly generated feasible values for other parameters such as γ n,k , c k , etc. ∀ n, ∀ k. We ran Algorithm 1 to see the effect of different values of price adjusting parameter β k . We then plotted the number of iterations that is needed for different values of β k , as shown in Fig. 2 . Note that, as expected, the smaller the β k is, the longer the iteration the algorithm takes to converge, and vice versa. There is a significant difference in the number of iterations when β k decreases from 0.005 to its lower values, as shown in Fig. 2 . Note that we can choose any value β k 1 but chose β k = 0.005 for the remaining simulation setups.
In the second experiment, we have considered an overloaded system with N = 6 and K = 3. Note that, as mentioned, we assume that the SUs use code-division multiple-access technology to avoid interference while they communicate through opportunistic spectrum access. Minimum required SINRs were chosen as {γ 1,1 , γ 1,2 , γ 1,3 } = {0.43, 0.36, 0.29}, {γ 2,1 , γ 2,2 ,  γ 2,3 }={0.81, 0.72, 0.63}, {γ 3,1 , γ 3,2 , γ 3,3 }={1.19, 1.08, 0.97},  {γ 4,1 , γ 4,2 , γ 4,3 }={1.58, 1.44, 1.31}, {γ 5,1 , γ 5,2 , γ 5,3 }={2 .00, 1.80, 1.65}, and {γ 6,1 , γ 6,2 , γ 6,3 } = {2.34, 2.16, 2.01}, which are admissible in the system. Initial prices by SPs were randomly chosen, and they were c 1 = 0.97, c 2 = 0.93, and c 3 = 0.88. The specific values considered in the simulation for B n were B 1 = 1, B 2 = 2, B 3 = 3, B 4 = 4, B 5 = 5, and B 6 = 6, and available spectral capacities of SPs were as S 1 = 40, S 2 = 45, and S 3 = 50. Then, for the given scenario, we ran Algorithm 1 and plotted variations of SINRs and payoffs of SUs, and variations of unit prices and revenues of SPs until Algorithm 1 reaches the Stackelberg equilibrium and plotted the results as shown in Fig. 3(a) and (b) . We observed that individual users are demanding high SINRs to get high QoS or data rate [as shown in Fig. 3(a) ] and, thus, to get higher user payoffs [as shown in Fig. 3(b) ] while satisfying their imposed budget and SINR constraints. The variation in unit prices and revenues of SPs until the algorithm converges are shown in Fig. 4(a) and (b) , respectively. Because of competitions among SPs while setting prices, each SP is reducing its price as shown in Fig. 4(a) using noncooperative game based on the demands from SUs and its own spectral capacity. Meanwhile, each SP is maximizing its revenue as shown in Fig. 4(b) .
We also plotted the SINR variation of individual radios of a given SU as shown in Fig. 5(a) until the iterative algorithm reaches the Nash equilibrium. Note that all instantaneous SINRs for all radios are above their corresponding minimum desired SINRs. When there is only one type of communication, e.g., data communication, all radios of a given SU could be used to increase the overall data rate by combining SINRs of all radios. When there are simultaneous voice and data communications using a given device, one radio (of course, when minimum SINR requirements are met) could be used for voice communication and the other two radios could be used for data communications, as shown in Fig. 5(b) .
To compare our proposed algorithm with an algorithm in [27] , we consider an identical simulation scenario and plotted the SINR variation as shown in Fig. 6 . We observed that both the proposed algorithm and the algorithm in [27] satisfy the target SINR after the second iteration as in Fig. 6 . The algorithm in [27] tries to maintain the target SINR values for the users; however, our algorithm gives higher SINRs for the users than their corresponding minimum required/target values, which results in higher data rates. Furthermore, when we computed the revenue for SPs based on the fixed user SINRs obtained using the algorithm in [27] as shown in Fig. 6 , it is decreasing, which is obvious and not included in this paper.
We conclude that the simulation results verify that the proposed algorithm converges to the optimal Stackelberg equilibrium where each subgame reaches its equilibrium that maximizes the achievable rates of SUs and the revenues of SPs by satisfying their corresponding imposed constraints. We also note that our proposed approach outperforms the existing related methods.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have formulated a problem of DSA in heterogeneous wireless systems for SUs equipped with multiple radios as a two-stage Stackelberg game. We have investigated the Stackelberg game in terms of two subgames: the SUs' SURMG (SUs' subgame) in which SUs maximize their payoffs (achievable rates) subject to budget and QoS constraints implied by their minimum required SINRs and the SPs' SPPSG (SPs' subgame) in which SPs update their price strategies to maximize their revenue functions subject to their spectral capacities. The proposed game provides a tradeoff between QoS of SUs and revenues of SPs. We have derived a closed form and shown that there exists a unique optimal point when the Stackelberg game is at equilibrium. Analytical and simulation studies have been presented to assess the performance of the proposed game, and the numerical results verify that the proposed approach converges and reaches the unique Stackelberg equilibrium. We also noted that our algorithm is superior than the existing methods.
APPENDIX PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To get γ n,k in (7), we start with K = 2 for N SUs. Then, the optimization problem (6) for a given SU n becomes
Problem (31) is convex and can be solved by using the Lagrangian method. Using Lagrange's multipliers λ 1 , λ 2 , and λ 3 for different constraints in (31), the Lagrangian equivalent of (31) can be expressed as
and the complementary Slackness conditions for (32) are
where λ 2 ≥ 0, λ 3 ≥ 0 since wireless transmissions need a γ n,k ≥ γ n,k condition for error-free communication. The firstorder optimality of (32) is given by differentiating L su,n with respect to γ n,k and equating it to zero, that is,
When we consider k = 1 for (37), we get
and for k = 2, we get
Based upon the services that SUs are getting, they could take one of the following forms. Case 1: Both need good quality, i.e., γ n,1 > γ n,1 and γ n,2 > γ n,2 . This implies from (34) and (35) that λ 2 = 0, and λ 3 = 0. After substituting λ 2 = 0, and λ 3 = 0 in (38) and (39), respectively, and after a few mathematical steps, we get
Then, we can express in general form in terms of k as
Substituting (42) in (33) and after a few algebraic steps, we get
Finally, substituting (43) into (42), we get 
and from (34), when we have γ n,1 > γ n,1 , then λ 2 = 0. From (38) , when λ 2 = 0, we get
Substituting (46) into (33), we can get
Since λ 1 > 0 in (47), we can write (w n,k /λ 1 ) + c 2 γ n,2 − c k − B n = 0 which yields
Substituting λ 1 of (48) into (46), we get
We can write (49) as
From (45), B n = 2c 2 γ n,2 + (c 2 − c 1 ), and after substituting B n into the second term of the righthand side of (50), we get
we can express (51) as
Remark: When γ n,1 = γ n,1 and γ n,2 > γ n,2 , we will have λ 1 = 0. Using a similar approach as in Case 2, we can easily get
Case 3: Both services meet minimum SINR requirements, i.e., γ n,1 = γ n,1 and γ n,2 = γ n,2 . This implies from (33) that λ 1 = 0 since B n > 0. The values of λ 2 and λ 3 can be any nonnegative real number.
For K = 3 and K = 4, we derived expressions for γ n,k given as in (44), (52), and (53), which is not included in this paper. Thus, from (44), (52), and (53), we can generalize the SINR expression for an SU n in k as
which proves Theorem 1. 
